Deloitte’s Strategy for the U.S. Navy’s Submarine Workforce & Industrial Base Program

Phase 2: Component Deep Dive

Under RFP 47QFCA24R0024, the scope was broken into eight major components. For each, the intended outcomes (per the RFP), the context of Columbia/Virginia-class submarine production issues, and the common federal program bottlenecks addressed are examined below:

1. Workforce Development

 

• Intended Outcomes: Dramatically expand the pipeline of skilled trades and professionals for submarine construction and sustainment. The RFP calls for the EIP to “build and recruit adequate hiring pools for vendors and shipbuilders; train current and future trades; [and] improve wrap-around support to increase student and worker retention.” (highergov.com) In practice, this means standing up or augmenting training programs (welding, machining, quality control, etc.), forging partnerships with technical schools and unions, and improving apprenticeship and retention programs in regions critical to submarine building (e.g. New England, Virginia). Success is measured by increases in the number of qualified workers entering the submarine industrial base and reductions in labor shortfalls for key skills.

• Context in Submarine Programs: Both the Columbia-class SSBN and Virginia-class SSN programs have been hampered by workforce shortages. The naval shipbuilding workforce was allowed to atrophy after the Cold War, and ramping it back up has proven difficult. The Navy needs over 100,000 new workers in the next decade to meet demand (insidedefense.com) – a massive recruiting challenge. At present, major contractors like Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding have backlogs partly because they cannot hire/train skilled trades fast enough. For example, specialized welders and pipefitters are in short supply, slowing assembly of submarine hull sections. The [Columbia-class program] is on a tight schedule to replace aging Ohio-class boats, and any labor shortfall directly threatens schedule. The Navy has recognized that without proactive workforce development (beyond traditional hiring), the goal of 1+2 subs/year is unachievable (navsea.navy.milwashingtontechnology.com). Initiatives such as the state-sponsored Accelerated Training in Defense Manufacturing (ATDM) in Virginia have started addressing this, but a broader, coordinated effort is needed (washingtontechnology.com).

• Bottlenecks Addressed: This component tackles classic federal program bottlenecks around skilled labor supply and training pipelines. Common issues include an aging trades workforce approaching retirement, a lack of young workers entering industrial trades, competition from commercial industries, and regional limitations (e.g. high cost of living near shipyards deterring new entrants). Moreover, disparate efforts (Navy programs, Department of Labor grants, state workforce boards) were not unified – a problem of coordination. By focusing on workforce development, the RFP addresses bottlenecks in recruiting (insufficient outreach and appeal of manufacturing careers), training throughput (limited training capacity or instructors), and retention (high attrition due to burnout or outside opportunities). This aligns with the Navy’s new holistic view that “it’s not just people… it’s also supply chain, aging infrastructure, [and] economic issues… all of these things are intertwined.”(navsea.navy.mil) In short, expanding the workforce relieves a critical constraint on submarine production capacity while also rejuvenating the defense industrial base talent pool.

2. Supplier Development
 

• Intended Outcomes: Grow and strengthen the submarine supply chain by increasing the capacity and capability of existing suppliers and onboarding new qualified suppliers. The RFP directs the EIP to “add capability and/or capacity to existing suppliers” and likely to identify and develop new sources for materials and components (highergov.com). Outcomes include reducing single points of failure in the supply chain, decreasing lead times for critical parts, and raising the overall production output of key vendors (for instance, makers of propulsion plant components, speciality forgings, or electronics for submarines). The program should result in more robust subcontractor performance – fewer late deliveries or quality issues – and a larger pool of companies able to contribute to sub construction and maintenance.

• Context in Submarine Programs: The submarine industrial base beyond the two prime shipbuilders is relatively narrow. Years of industry consolidation and sporadic demand left many sole-source or single–point failure suppliers. Columbia-class subs, for example, require components (like missile tube sections or heavy castings) made by only one or two companies; if those companies struggle, the whole program is delayed. The Virginia program has already seen parts shortages and supplier quality problems contributing to “significant schedule delays.” (insidedefense.com) With the ramp-up to build Columbia and more Virginias (and even additional demand from Australia/U.K. under AUKUS), the existing supplier base capacity is insufficient. The Navy is pouring billions (over $11B in FY25–FY29 proposed) into industrial base investments (insidedefense.com), including via the Defense Production Act, to help suppliers expand factories and hire staff. This RFP’s supplier development component is meant to coordinate and supplement those efforts. It acknowledges that expanding submarine production is not just a shipyard issue but also “modernizing the shipbuilding component supply chain.” (insidedefense.com) For example, in September 2024 the Navy awarded Austal USA a $152M contract to invest in a new facility to manufacture submarine componentsg (ovconwire.com) – a clear case of bringing in a new supplier to broaden capacity. Such efforts need integration under a cohesive plan.

• Bottlenecks Addressed: This addresses bottlenecks in industrial base capacity and resiliency common in federal programs: over-reliance on a few suppliers, limited surge capacity, and lengthy qualification processes for new vendors. Typically, federal acquisition struggles to rapidly expand a supply base due to complex contracting and stringent quality requirements (especially for nuclear submarines, where certifications are critical). The RFP pushes an enterprise solution: actively find bottleneck areas (e.g. castings, circuit boards, valves), work with current suppliers to boost output (perhaps via capital investments or process improvements), and identify alternate suppliers (and help them meet Navy specs). It mirrors a broader DoD shift from a constrained “defense industrial base” to a more agile “defense industrial network” of diverse providers (www2.deloitte.com). By addressing supplier development, the program aims to mitigate risks of parts shortages and ensure that if one vendor fails, others can fill the gap. This is a proactive approach to supply chain risk management seldom seen in traditional programs – essentially federal supply chain diversification and scaling to meet urgent demand.
   

3. Industrial Process Optimization
 

• Intended Outcomes: Improve the efficiency and throughput of manufacturing and industrial processes critical to submarine production. This component focuses on optimizing workflows at shipyards and key suppliers – essentially modernizing facilities, processes, and tooling to shorten build times and increase capacity. The RFP likely calls for lean process improvements, removal of production bottlenecks, and upgrades to aging infrastructure. Intended outcomes include reduced labor hours per submarine, improved cycle times for sub-assembly, higher first-time quality rates, and better utilization of shipyard facilities. In short, make the existing industrial base produce more, faster – e.g. enabling Electric Boat’s yards and Newport News to construct modules in parallel more effectively, or helping a metalworks supplier increase its output via improved factory layout.

• Context in Submarine Programs: The current submarine production surge is straining not just people and suppliers but also processes and infrastructure. Many submarine construction processes are labor-intensive and have changed little in decades (or are supported by dated IT systems). For instance, work sequencing issues and trade skill misalignment can cause delays on the assembly line. There are also capacity constraints in physical infrastructure: limited drydocks, out-of-date tooling, etc. The Navy and industry have acknowledged that to sustainably achieve 1+2 subs per year, they must adopt modern manufacturing techniques and processes across the board (washingtontechnology.com). This includes things like modular construction improvements, better production planning, use of robotics or automation where possible, and debottlenecking critical path operations. The inclusion of “Industrial Process Optimization” in the RFP indicates a recognition that throwing money at workforce and suppliers alone won’t succeed without streamlining how submarines are built. In fact, the Washington Technology report on the award noted that “accelerating the development and adoption of more modern manufacturing techniques and processes across the U.S. maritime supply chain” is a major goal alongside workforce growth (washingtontechnology.com). The context is akin to an automotive factory ramping up production – you address training, suppliers, and factory efficiency together.

• Bottlenecks Addressed: This component targets internal process inefficiencies that commonly plague large programs: outdated workflows, suboptimal facility layouts, lack of real-time data, etc. In federal shipbuilding, these manifest as schedule delays, cost growth, and quality issues. By optimizing processes, the program addresses bottlenecks such as long queue times (e.g. one shop waiting for another to finish), excess scrap/rework, and inflexible production lines. It dovetails with technology adoption (see below) – many optimizations will involve new tech or at least new methods (like digital task scheduling or advanced welding techniques). Crucially, it also covers infrastructure modernization; aging shipyard infrastructure has been cited in reports as limiting throughput (for example, lack of sufficient crane capacity or out-of-service facilities). The RFP, influenced by the 2021 CAPE study, explicitly included infrastructure development as a line of effort (insidedefense.com), meaning the EIP will help prioritize and coordinate infrastructure upgrades (some funded by the Navy’s parallel $11.1B investment plan (insidedefense.com). Overall, Industrial Process Optimization addresses the productivity bottleneck – ensuring that increased workforce and suppliers translate into actual higher output, rather than being wasted by inefficiency.
   

4. Strategic Outsourcing Plan
 

• Intended Outcomes: Develop and implement a strategic outsourcing roadmap to redistribute workload and production activities in order to alleviate overload at primary facilities and accelerate delivery. The intended outcome is a clear plan for what portions of submarine construction or related work can be outsourced to other entities – whether other shipyards, private companies, or perhaps even allied capabilities – without compromising quality or security. For example, the plan might identify that certain non-nuclear modules or components currently built at the main shipyards could be built by other shipyards or manufacturers (as Austal USA is now doing for Columbia-class ancillary components (govconwire.com). The outcome would be increased total production capacity by tapping external partners, along with risk mitigation through geographic dispersion of manufacturing. This plan would include timelines and business arrangements for each outsourcing initiative (e.g. subcontract, public-private partnership, use of third-party funding like the United Submarine Alliance fund).

• Context in Submarine Programs: Traditionally, U.S. nuclear submarines have been built by two shipyards only (General Dynamics Electric Boat and HII’s Newport News). That duopoly has limited capacity – and these yards are now juggling both Virginia-class and Columbia-class construction (plus maintenance availabilities). With the pressure of AUKUS (potentially involving building submarines for Australia as well) (insidedefense.com), it’s clear the Navy cannot rely solely on two yards. The Navy has thus begun exploring outsourcing and third-party investment. The contract to Austal USA in 2024 to develop submarine component capacity is one such move (govconwire.com), essentially outsourcing some fabrication to a Gulf Coast shipbuilder not previously involved in nukes. The Strategic Outsourcing Plan component of the RFP institutionalizes this approach – the EIP is to systematically figure out “who else can do X, and how to get them on board.” This might include engaging smaller shipyards for sub-module construction, leveraging depots or Navy shipyards for less complex work, or partnering with suppliers to take on integration tasks. It could even consider allied outsourcing in some form (for example, integrating UK or Australian supply chain contributions under AUKUS, though that is sensitive and long-term). By making a plan, the Navy hopes to broaden the industrial base beyond its traditional boundaries.

• Bottlenecks Addressed: The outsourcing component addresses the capacity bottleneck and geographic concentration risk. In federal terms, it’s tackling the fact that if all work stays in two overloaded facilities, no amount of process improvement will meet the nation’s needs in time. Bottlenecks include limited drydock/build space, workforce saturation in one locale, and vulnerability to local disruptions. Strategic outsourcing spreads the workload to increase resilience and throughput. This is analogous to how NASA or the Air Force might introduce a second source for rocket engines or satellites to augment capacity. It also confronts bureaucratic bottlenecks: normally, establishing a new production source for a nuclear sub component could take years of approval – the plan would outline steps to streamline this, perhaps via pre-approvals or leveraging Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) where possible. In sum, this component aims to break the bottleneck of limited production venues by tapping external partners. Challenges include ensuring outsourced work meets the Navy’s stringent quality/safety standards, but addressing that is part of the plan’s scope (e.g. certification programs for new suppliers). When executed, strategic outsourcing should shorten build times by doing work in parallel at multiple sites and provide surge capacity that the core shipyards alone lack.
   

5. Technology Adoption Acceleration
 

• Intended Outcomes: Rapidly introduce and scale new technologies to enhance submarine design, manufacturing, and sustainment. This component aims to shorten the innovation cycle in the submarine enterprise – identifying promising advanced technologies and accelerating their adoption across the industrial base. Intended outcomes include higher productivity and quality through tech like automation, robotics, additive manufacturing (3D printing of submarine parts), artificial intelligence/machine learning for design optimization and supply chain forecasting, advanced welding and nondestructive testing techniques, digital twin simulations of submarine modules, and modern IT systems for program management. The RFP likely expects the EIP to pilot new tech and then roll out those that prove effective, thereby modernizing production faster than traditional acquisition processes allow. In concrete terms, success could be measured by, say, implementation of a digital welding training program that cuts certification time by 30%, or deployment of AI-based supply chain analytics that reduce material stockouts.

• Context in Submarine Programs: The submarine industrial base has been slow to adopt emerging manufacturing technologies, in part due to the conservative nature of nuclear-certified processes and the long lifecycle of submarines (designs can span decades). However, to meet aggressive production goals, the Navy realizes it must leverage 21st-century tech. For example, additive manufacturing could potentially produce certain components or tooling faster, and the Navy has started to approve 3D-printed parts for subs in limited cases. Digital thread/digital twin technology could allow engineers to virtually iron out production issues before physical construction. The Columbia program can benefit from any efficiency gained by new tech since it has a very tight schedule. There is also an urgency from competition: peer adversaries are innovating, and the U.S. wants to maintain an edge in how quickly it can build and field submarines. The RFP’s inclusion of tech acceleration – essentially a mandate to “bring modern manufacturing techniques to the shop floor now, not years from now” – speaks to this urgency. It complements the process optimization task: some process improvements will come via new technologies. The context also includes the Pentagon’s broader push for innovation (e.g. via the Defense Innovation Unit and other initiatives). In June 2024, Defense One reported on ad campaigns and training initiatives (via BlueForge) to attract workers (washingtontechnology.com); coupling that with technological tools (like VR training simulators for welders) would multiply the impact.

• Bottlenecks Addressed: This component addresses the innovation adoption bottleneck common in defense programs – the lag between technology availability and its integration into operations. Federal acquisitions often suffer from lengthy testing and qualification processes for new tech, cultural resistance, and funding silos that slow adoption. By giving the EIP a role in tech adoption, the Navy is effectively bypassing some bureaucracy: the contractor can use program funds to experiment with tech on the fly. Bottlenecks targeted include obsolete equipment on production lines, inefficient legacy IT systems (for design, logistics, etc.), and lack of real-time data. Accelerating technology adoption helps overcome these by injecting solutions like modern ERP systems or IoT sensors that increase visibility and efficiency. Another bottleneck is the fragmented approach to innovation – multiple stakeholders might separately try new tools (NAVSEA, shipyards, OSD) without coordination. Under this program, the EIP can evaluate and coordinate tech deployments so that a successful pilot at one shipyard can be quickly replicated at others. Essentially, it is establishing a fast-track pipeline for innovation into the submarine enterprise, cutting through red tape. This should yield a more digitally advanced production line faster than normal and ensure the submarine industrial base is keeping pace with Industry 4.0 trends, rather than lagging years behind.
   

6. Metrics & Program Management
 

• Intended Outcomes: Implement a comprehensive program management structure and performance measurement system to govern all the above efforts. The intended outcomes are robust oversight, transparency, and agility in execution. Concretely, the RFP expects the EIP to set up a Program Management Office (PMO) structure with integrated metrics dashboards to track progress on workforce numbers, supplier output, production rates, etc., and a centralized schedule and risk management framework. The Navy wants a single authoritative view of how the entire initiative is moving the needle toward the 1+2 subs/year goal. Deliverables likely include monthly progress reports with quantitative metrics, a risk register and mitigation plans, earned value management of the various projects, and coordination forums for stakeholders. The overarching outcome is to keep all moving parts aligned and enable early identification of issues so they can be corrected (true integration management).

• Context in Submarine Programs: Given the complexity of ramping up submarine production, having strong program management is crucial. Historically, one reason large federal initiatives falter is lack of unified oversight – different offices doing bits and pieces without a coherent picture. The Navy’s submarine workforce/base expansion cuts across NAVSEA (shipbuilding), OPNAV (resource sponsors), OSD (Industrial Policy), Congress (funding), suppliers, state governments, etc. Prior to this, there was no single entity tracking combined progress; for example, workforce training results might be tracked by a Navy program office, but how that translates into improved delivery schedules wasn’t clearly quantified. By embedding Metrics & Program Management in the RFP, the Navy essentially outsourced the role of master integrator to Deloitte. This ensures that as initiatives spin up (training programs, supplier investments, etc.), someone is collecting data and measuring impact. For context, this is similar to how big private-sector transformations are run – with a “control tower” or PMO that monitors key performance indicators and coordinates sub-projects. The importance of this was highlighted by GSA FEDSIM as well, given the contract’s magnitude: GSA needed an integrator to be accountable for meeting outcomes, not just doing disparate tasks.

• Bottlenecks Addressed: This component tackles bureaucratic and coordination bottlenecks. In federal programs, one bottleneck to success is often the lack of real-time metrics and feedback loops – programs go off-track before leadership realizes. By establishing an integrated dashboard (covering everything from recruiting numbers to part delivery timelines), the program can promptly address shortfalls. It also addresses the bottleneck of fragmented responsibility: with Deloitte as PM, there is clear ownership of outcomes. Typical bottlenecks like slow decision-making are mitigated by having an agile management process – e.g. weekly inter-agency sync meetings facilitated by the EIP, and data-driven decision-making enabled by the metrics. End-to-end visibility is a goal; Deloitte is expected to provide that via modern tools (e.g. a supply chain control tower that aggregates data across sources) (www2.deloitte.comwww2.deloitte.com). For instance, Deloitte might implement a centralized data platform where the Navy can see how many people were trained this quarter, how many valves were produced by suppliers, and how those compare to targets. This ensures accountability and helps justify the ROI of the $2.4B investment – a critical factor given congressional oversight interest. In summary, Metrics & Program Management is the glue holding the effort together, preventing the classic bottleneck of “initiative overload” where many efforts don’t add up due to poor integration. It creates a single source of truth and coordination for the entire enterprise improvement program.
   

7. Cross-Government/Industry Collaboration
 

• Intended Outcomes: Foster seamless collaboration among government entities and industry partners involved in the submarine enterprise. The RFP envisions the EIP coordinating “all participating partners and stakeholders, including government and non-government entities.” (insidedefense.com) The outcome is a sustained partnership framework – potentially formalized through working groups, steering committees, or collaborative platforms – that brings together the Navy, OSD (e.g. the ICAM Office, DASD Industrial Base Resilience), shipbuilder primes, key suppliers, educational institutions, state/local governments in shipyard regions, and non-profits like BlueForge Alliance. This collaboration should result in aligned goals and synchronized actions: for example, state-run training programs feeding directly into Navy workforce needs, or DoD and industry jointly investing in a supplier’s expansion. A tangible deliverable might be a governance board comprising Navy, DoD, and industry leaders that meets regularly to guide the overall effort. Another could be data-sharing agreements that allow industry and government to exchange information (like workforce projections or supply chain health metrics) more freely than before. Essentially, the outcome is the breakdown of traditional silos and the creation of a unified team focused on submarine industrial base revival.

 

• Context in Submarine Programs: The scope of the submarine build-up spans multiple stakeholders. For instance, the ICAM office (Innovation Capability and Modernization) in OSD is funding many industrial base projects and directly supports the DASD for Industrial Base Resilience (highergov.com). The Navy’s Program Executive Offices (like PEO Submarines) are consumers of this workforce and supplier output. The Department of Labor might be involved for apprenticeship funding, and state governments (Connecticut, Virginia, Rhode Island etc.) have their own economic development initiatives around the shipyards. Pre-EIP, these actors coordinated on an ad-hoc basis. The Sea-Air-Space 2024 panel titled “The Submarine Workforce Industrial Base Challenge” highlighted the need for “a robust partnership between the government, industry, and educational institutions” (navsea.navy.mil). Panelists from the Navy, workforce councils, and industry agreed that collaboration is key to attract and retain talent for 3 subs/year (navsea.navy.mil). Thus, the RFP formally makes facilitating cross-government/industry collaboration a task – something not usually explicitly contracted out. The context is that the Navy knows it must play an integrative role beyond its traditional acquisition function – reaching into local community colleges, coordinating with the Department of Education on vocational programs, etc. Deloitte, as an outside party, can sometimes bridge gaps more easily (being perceived as neutral) and dedicate full-time effort to coordination.

• Bottlenecks Addressed: This addresses institutional and communication bottlenecks. A common issue in federal programs is that different agencies or industry players do not communicate effectively, leading to duplication or gaps. For example, a local training program might produce graduates that the industry isn’t prepared to hire because of a timing mismatch – simply due to lack of coordination. By establishing structured collaboration (e.g. information sharing and joint planning), those bottlenecks are reduced. It also addresses the “stove-pipe” bottleneck: each stakeholder looking only at their slice. The EIP’s role in collaboration is to ensure everyone is looking at the big picture and rowing in the same direction. Additionally, government bureaucracy can slow partnerships (MOUs, data sharing restrictions, etc.); having a contractor intermediary can sometimes expedite these by facilitating agreements and maintaining neutrality. In essence, this component lubricates the interfaces between stakeholders, which is essential for an effort that spans public-private boundaries. The expectation is that by the end of the contract, a sustainable collaborative network will exist (potentially an enduring council or task force) so that the improvements continue beyond Deloitte’s tenure.
   

8. Lifecycle Planning
 

• Intended Outcomes: Ensure that the improvements in workforce and industrial base are sustained over the long term and aligned with the Navy’s future force structure needs. Lifecycle Planning means looking beyond the immediate Columbia and Virginia construction rush and planning for the entire lifecycle of submarines – including maintenance/overhaul cycles, future submarine programs, and potential downturns after peak production. Intended outcomes include a strategic workforce and production plan that covers the next 10–20 years, addressing how to keep the workforce engaged when production tempos eventually change, how suppliers can transition to sustainment work (maintenance, repairs) after new-build demand stabilizes, and preparation for the next-generation submarine (SSN(X) or successor programs). Essentially, it’s to prevent a boom-bust cycle by laying out a vision for continuous utilization of the industrial base. Deliverables might be a Submarine Industrial Base Roadmap that is delivered to the Navy, containing scenario-based plans (e.g. if AUKUS drives additional sub orders or if there’s a gap between Columbia and SSN(X) construction). This plan would inform Navy budget requests and policy decisions to smooth out the workload.

• Context in Submarine Programs: The Navy has seen the consequences of failing to plan long-term: after the 1990s drawdown, the submarine industrial base shrank dramatically, leading to today’s shortages. Conversely, now there’s a risk of over-expansion for Columbia that could collapse later if not managed. With AUKUS, the U.S., U.K., and Australia are trying to coordinate submarine building over decades – lifecycle planning is international as well. Congress will scrutinize that the big investments made now don’t result in wasted capacity later. Also, submarines have 30+ year lifespans with mid-life overhauls; the workforce needed to build now could be transitioned to life-cycle support later (e.g. working at naval shipyards for refits) – but only if planned and coordinated. Thus, the RFP includes lifecycle planning to ensure the Navy gets a future-proof industrial base. It aligns with broader defense-industrial policy which calls for sustaining critical industrial capabilities. For example, as Columbia production winds down in the 2030s, that skilled workforce might shift to refueling and overhauling those same subs or building whatever comes next – avoiding layoffs and knowledge loss. By having Deloitte map this out, the Navy gains a proactive strategy rather than reactive measures.

 

• Bottlenecks Addressed: Lifecycle planning addresses the strategic planning bottleneck in government acquisitions. Often, programs ramp up and down without a smooth transition, due to funding cycles and lack of cross-program vision. This leads to the loss of skilled labor and supplier bankruptcies when a production run ends. By planning the lifecycle, the program mitigates the risk of a bust after the current boom. It also addresses policy bottlenecks: for instance, budgeting for workforce sustainment or supplier retention in years when new-build orders dip is traditionally hard to justify – a solid plan with data (from this initiative) can back up those budget requests. Additionally, lifecycle planning will identify future capability gaps early (e.g. if a new technology will be needed for SSN(X), start developing that workforce skill now). In short, it’s about institutionalizing the gains made so they endure. This component ensures that the Navy and DoD do not treat the submarine surge as a one-off emergency, but rather integrate it into a continuous cycle of industrial base management. By doing so, it addresses the long-term bottleneck of “feast or famine” procurement that has historically plagued shipbuilding. The result should be a stable core workforce and supplier base that can flex as needed but not fall apart after peak production, thereby preserving the nation’s strategic shipbuilding capability for the future.